(Post-)Kemalist secularism in Turkey by Tombuş H.E. & Aygenç B.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cjsb20
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies
ISSN: 1944-8953 (Print) 1944-8961 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjsb20
(Post-)Kemalist Secularism in Turkey
H. Ertuğ Tombuş & Berfu Aygenç
To cite this article: H. Ertuğ Tombuş & Berfu Aygenç (2017) (Post-)Kemalist Secularism in Turkey,
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 19:1, 70-85, DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2016.1201995
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2016.1201995
Published online: 03 Jan 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 534
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles 
Journal of Balkan and near eastern studies, 2017
Vol. 19, no. 1, 70–85
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2016.1201995
(Post-)Kemalist Secularism in Turkey
H. Ertuğ Tombuşa and Berfu Aygençb
adepartment of Political science and Public administration, Bilkent university, Bilkent, ankara, turkey; 
bdepartment of sociology, new school for social research, new York, usa
ABSTRACT
The relationship between the state and religion established by 
the founding Republican regime has often had discriminatory 
consequences for religious plurality in Turkey. From its foundation in 
1923, the state maintained a model of secularism in which religious 
activities and facilities were brought under state control. The ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) has challenged the so-called 
Kemalist secularism and claimed to offer a liberal alternative. 
However, the AKP’s policies have also remained controversial. This 
article focuses on how and in what direction the AKP has transformed 
Kemalist secularism by examining institutional transformations in the 
military, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the national 
education system. It is argued that the AKP has maintained the 
same authoritarian practices and institutions in relation to religious 
plurality. In particular, the Diyanet and compulsory religious education 
have been appropriated by the AKP for the purpose of executing a 
conservative-Islamic political and social transformation that aims 
to eradicate plurality and create a monolithic society through 
indoctrination and a strict state monopoly over religious matters.
Introduction
Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, the relationship between the state and reli-
gion underwent different stages of association, contestation and at times open conflict. The 
founding elite of the Republic considered religion to be a threat to the modern republican 
project. From its very inception in 1923 it therefore adopted a particular model of secularism 
as one of the fundamental principles of the new regime. Accordingly, religious activities and 
facilities were brought under state control and rights and freedoms of religious groups were 
largely restricted. The Turkish model of secularism, however, was unable to solve diverse 
groups’ contestation and conflict over the state-controlled model. Specifically, the Kemalist 
policies and institutions failed to accommodate the cultural and political claims of various 
religious groups, thus inhibiting and restricting socio-cultural and religious plurality in 
public and political life.
The founding secular model entered a crisis during subsequent stages of political 
development when ethno-religious and cultural claims increased, in parallel to the rise 
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of political Islam and the revival of Alevism.1 The crisis of secularism was only one 
manifestation of the larger crisis facing Turkish modernity, which was characterized 
by a top-down elite-driven approach. The monolithic nation-state building project 
ultimately undermined calls for plurality, equality and the extension of religious rights 
and liberties to various actors in Turkish society. Reactions against the secularist pol-
icies went hand in hand with the rise of various groups’ ethno-religious and cultural 
claims. As Kadioglu notes, ‘[s]ecularization in the form of a project [of laicism] paved 
the way to a dialectical choreography that negated itself by generating its own rival’.2 In 
the end, escalating conflicts between secular elites and religious groups hollowed out 
consensus on what were to be the Republic’s values and turned into a chronic problem 
of contemporary Turkey.
From the time of its creation in 2001, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
challenged the restrictive and exclusionary practices of the Kemalist model of secularism. 
As a powerful political force able to form four consecutive majority governments, the AKP 
also promised to reshuffle the model towards a new democratic alternative. Its political 
project of conservative democracy as defined in its programme was largely seen as an 
antidote to the Kemalist model. This new alternative to the established relations between 
the state and religion helped the AKP gain a large basis of support beyond its immediate 
Sunni-oriented religious constituency. The liberals, social democrats and leftist political 
actors, who were critical of Kemalism, welcomed the AKP’s alternative. At the end of its 
14 years in power as a one-party government, the AKP has gradually but steadily revised 
some of the institutional set-up of the secular model and successfully removed the old 
Kemalist establishment from state structures.3 The outcome of this transformation in 
reshuffling the restrictions of the Kemalist model, however, has been at best controversial. 
For some, the AKP-led reforms brought about the end of the Kemalist era and of the 
authoritarian reflexes of the Turkish state, becoming a turning point in the normalization 
of politics. For many others, instead of expanding democratic gains, the AKP appropriated 
key Kemalist institutions and used them to consolidate its own power at the expense of 
broad democratic rights and freedoms. Most notably, the Gezi events in the summer of 
2013 showed that the AKP has reversed, if not suspended, some of the key social-political 
rights as well as institutional safeguards that enable the accommodation of diverse groups 
in Turkish society.
This article analyses the development and reshuffling of institutional arrangements, 
which characterize the founding model of Turkish secularism, in order to assess in what 
direction the AKP governance has steered the inherited model of the Turkish Republic. 
To evaluate the change and continuity in the AKP policies, we critically analyse the main 
features and restrictions of the Kemalist model of secularism, its principles, institutions 
and political consequences. Section II investigates the changes and continuities of the 
model in re-envisaging measures of religious freedom and equality under successive 
AKP governments. We focus on how and indeed whether relations between the state 
and religion have advanced towards a more inclusive and pluralist political trajectory, 
which seeks to accommodate religious freedoms and equality.4 A critical analysis of the 
Kemalist model and the direction of the AKP’s policies and discourse on religion may 
not only help us to understand the consequences of specific institutional choices and 
mechanisms but also to evaluate the crucial role of the state in developing a democratic 
plural life.
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Secularism, the nation-state and modernity in Turkey
The Republican elites tried to incorporate western attitudes, practices and laws into Turkish 
society in order to engineer a modern nation-state and society. When envisioning this pro-
ject, Kemalists ‘saw religion as a political threat [to the new regime] and Islam, in particular, 
as a cause of social, cultural, political and economic decline’.5 Also, as a precaution against 
the reinstatement of the old regime, which adopted a clear religious orientation, the new 
state entrepreneurs implemented a series of reforms that limited the visibility of religion 
and religious practices. Among those reforms were the abolishment of the sultanate and the 
office of the caliphate, the closure of dervish lodges, the introduction of a new dress code 
for men and women in public life, the imposition of secular education, the adoption of the 
new Latin alphabet instead of Arabic script, and the replacement of Islamic law with modern 
civil and family law. These reforms not only contributed to uniform practices nationwide 
but also made secularism one of the key determinants of the aspired and homogeneous 
Turkish national identity.6
In this project of state building, both national identity and the national public sphere were 
marked by the ‘secular order of the Republic’. Accordingly, the state elites entrenched their 
ideal of secularism in the constitutional framework and everyday practices. The model of 
secularism presented by the state modernizers, therefore, was not the organic outcome of 
societal development, as it had evolved in western societies. In the case of Turkey, it emerged 
as a result of intense processes of social engineering or as a political project with author-
itarian dimensions.7 The elite-driven and top-down dimension of this social engineering 
was problematic from the start, in the sense that the Kemalist raison d’état developed as a 
type of governmentality that reduced politics to a social technique in order to produce a 
certain social order and to control society.8 As Davison correctly asserts, the secular reforms 
‘created a new structure of control and oversight between the state and Islam’ while ‘the 
Republic’s founders sought to use the powers of state to interpret, oversee, and administer 
religious doctrine and practice’.9 The authoritarian element of new relations between state 
and religion, inherent in the Kemalist model, manifested itself in monopolized decisions on 
religious matters and imposed orthodoxy on society. This raison d’état, moreover, did not 
insist on an egalitarian political project that guaranteed plurality and diversity of Turkish 
society. On the contrary, it insisted on a political doctrine that supervises and reproduces 
social cohesion, a unified national identity, and the primacy of the state at the expense of 
citizens’ individual or collective rights and liberties.
The evolution of the modernization project showed that the state in fact controlled reli-
gion to achieve simultaneously two contrary purposes. On the one hand, by placing religion 
under strict state control, the Kemalist state aimed to eliminate possible reactionary religious 
movements and disintegrative threats against the Republic and its fundamental reforms. To 
leave religion to operate independently of the state’s monopoly was considered a possible 
threat with destabilizing consequences for the state’s projected values. On the other hand, 
the state actively defined and reproduced Sunni Islam as orthodoxy in Turkish society. ‘[T]
he Kemalists not only subordinated religion to the state, they also used and manipulated 
religion, that is, the correct Kemalist Sunni Orthodox version of Islam, for their own par-
ticular political purposes.’10 Accordingly, the Kemalist establishment moved to incorporate 
and/or suppress the public role of religion, depending on how much ‘religion’ at any time 
was needed to reproduce or maintain the nation’s monolithic identity, to restrain disruption 
of diversity and to mobilize the masses against differences.11
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Overall, secularism in Turkey remained far from being a mediator of different worldviews 
and cultural practices. Instead, it blocked institutional means to reconcile differences. More 
specifically, it failed to either solve existing problems or identify the principles and proce-
dures to do so. By incorporating religion into the institutional infrastructure of the state, 
Kemalist secularism established a monopoly over religious matters; arranged for distribution 
of public resources in a partial and discriminatory manner that favoured a particular reli-
gion; attempted to eliminate and suppress alternative visions of what constitutes a political 
community and the public good; and used Sunni Islam as a tool for indoctrination in order 
to create the desired subject and social order.
The institutional dimension of Kemalist secularism
Contrary to the widespread belief that Kemalist secularists immediately sought to eradicate 
the role of religion in public life,12 the state establishment used religion to discipline the new 
Turkish citizen by controlling religious practices through institutional means. As Davison 
points out, religion ‘was not disestablished in the society, it was differently established’.13 
While the autonomous spheres of politics, law and science began to detach themselves from 
religious interpretations, Islam and its teachings inserted itself into public life as a part of 
national identity or in the form of a Turkish–Islamic synthesis. In this framework, Kemalist 
secularism granted the armed forces, the national education system and the Diyanet a 
privileged position in controlling and promoting an ‘enlightened’ version of Islam in soci-
ety. In these institutions, religion became instrumental in disseminating the new modern 
and national ideas among society as well as bolstering the political legitimacy of the new 
state.14 The congruity of religion, particularly that of Sunni Islam with nationalism, was 
thus embodied in the state structures and in the official discourse, so long as it remained 
framed by the state. The management of religion by the respective institutions deserves a 
closer look in order to understand the interventionist nature of Kemalist secularism.
The military
The civil–military relationship in Turkey has always been uneven and its character at any 
given time served as a useful indicator to assess who controlled the reins of state power. 
As ‘a self-appointed primary modernizer institution’ and ‘the vanguard of reform and the 
harbingers of enlightenment’ as well as ‘the ultimate guardian of the secular Republic against 
internal/external threats’, the military enjoyed the authority to project its power into the 
public and political sphere.15 Specifically, it was awarded ‘a variety of privileges, including 
freedom from control by the elected authorities’.16 In the Turkish context and history, the 
armed forces thus enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the political system, which places 
them above elected parties and executive power. They were often portrayed and in fact 
became ‘true guardians’ of the nation and national interests. Consequently, the military 
interrupted the civilian rule on several occasions through military interventions. As the 
protector, educator and disciplining body, in line with Kemalist principles, its interaction 
with religious groups, political Islam and especially Islamist political parties has not always 
been easy.
There have been several cases where the military expressed discontent with Islamic move-
ments. One of the reasons why the military intervened to interrupt the political process in 
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1960 was because the policies implemented by the then centre-right Democrat Party were 
thought to be out of step with the secular democratic principles of the Republic. The mil-
itary punished the party leaders and rewrote the Constitution. In 1962, it also established 
the National Security Council, whose initial role was to provide recommendations to the 
government on matters of national security and to assist in the formulation of national 
security policies.17 In February 1997, the National Security Council played a pivotal role 
in dissolving the coalition government and banning the then ruling conservative Islamist 
Welfare Party. Specifically, the Council forced the coalition government to enact a list of 
measures aimed at eliminating the rise of radical Islam.18 Finally, in 2007, just before the 
presidential elections, the Turkish Armed Forces published a warning to the ruling AKP 
government that read:
Recently, the prominent problem during the presidential election process has been focused 
on debating secularism. This situation has been followed with concern by the Turkish Armed 
Forces. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces has a side in these debates 
and is an absolute protector of secularism. Moreover, the Turkish Armed Forces is absolutely 
against the ongoing debates and negative comments, and, when needed, will put forward its 
attitude and deed, openly and clearly. No one should doubt that … the Turkish Armed Forces 
is resolute in performing the duties assigned to it by the laws.19
With this declaration the military sought to regain its control over the diffusion of religious 
ideas, symbols and actions and the extent to which it permitted political debate. Listing 
some of the incidents that it deemed to threaten the secular nature of the country, it called 
upon the general public, but mainly the government, to act in accordance with the rules 
governing the separation of state and religion.20
However, this ‘wall of separation’ that the military drew attention to has rarely been 
concrete. In the history of the republic, relations between the state and religion could be 
permeable as long as Islam served the interests of the state and homogeneity of the Turkish 
nation. This was especially apparent after the 1980 military intervention, when the army 
helped to institutionalize the role of religion and to expand its hegemony by making religious 
instruction compulsory in public schools, opening up several imam-hatip (religious voca-
tional) schools across the country, and ensuring constitutional protection for the Diyanet.21 
In addition to this, and in an attempt to suppress leftist movements and civil unrest, Sunni 
Islam and its teachings were made available in public institutions under the strict supervi-
sion of military leaders. However, this was not exclusive to the period after 1980. Since the 
foundation of the Republic, Islam has been integrated into military discourse. The ideas 
of Islam as one true religion, military service as a religious duty and martyrdom as the 
noblest path that a citizen can follow have been fostered in public and military education.22 
This led to a paradox. On the one hand the military was seen as a part of the differentiated 
settlement that supported the separation of state and religion, on the other as an authority 
that promoted specific religious values in national public space. This duality marked and 
distinguished the secularist model and experience of Turkey. The same holds true for the 
Diyanet and the education system, as will be illustrated below.
The Diyanet
Established in 1924 with Law No. 429, which formally recognizes it as a state institution, 
the Diyanet is responsible ‘to execute and administer the affairs of Islam and its places of 
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worship’. In subsequent decades its existence and role has been further institutionalized 
by the Constitutional system. In 1965, Law No. 633 granted the Diyanet responsibility ‘to 
execute religious duties in accordance with Islamic beliefs, prayer and ethics, to enlighten 
the public about religion and to administer places of worship’. Article 136 of the 1982 
military Constitution reads: ‘The Diyanet, which is within the general administration, shall 
exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of 
secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and 
integrity.’ According to Article 89 of the Political Parties Law, the section on the ‘Protection 
of Principles and Reform of Ataturk and the Secular Nature of the State’, the Diyanet enjoys 
also constitutional protection to the extent that the Constitutional Court can close down 
any political party that challenges it,23 on grounds that can be found in Articles 2 and 4 of 
the Constitution.24 Thus, the Diyanet retained constitutional authority to manage religious 
affairs and educate the public about Islam.
However, there are many problems with the ‘secular’ role and structure of the institu-
tion.25 For one, although it is a public organization that relies on the taxpayer’s money, the 
Diyanet informs the public about and administers the affairs of one particular version of 
Islam; that is, the Hanefi School of the Sunni sect. This specific bias, therefore, compromises 
the rights of members of other religions and non-believers, who are forced to support the 
Sunni community and its monetary needs through taxation. Second, as the sole authority 
responsible for ‘enlightening the public about religion’, it not only produces, reproduces 
and circulates knowledge about Islam, together with its practices, but also defines what 
constitutes ‘true Islam’. As a result, the Diyanet claims authority to define what amounts to 
belief. Finally, in its endeavours ‘aiming at national solidarity and integrity’, the institution 
seeks to harmonize Turkish nationhood with Islam. In other words, it aims to homoge-
nize the collective national imaginary by idealizing the combination between nation and 
Islam as the ‘desired’ or ‘planed’ state of Turkish citizenship. The main consequence is that 
Diyanet ignores and undermines the plural composition of society by leaving out other 
ethno- national and ethno-religious groups, such as Alevis, Jews, Rums and Armenians. 
Moreover, by following a particular strand of Islam, the Diyanet’s publications and textbooks 
used in obligatory religious instruction sanctify the Turkish nation and the state,26 making 
the institution a tool for legitimizing the established state order.
Although all this contradicts the democratic character of the state, as protected by the 
Constitution, it does not clash with the model of secularism that the founding elites envi-
sioned for the new Turkish Republic. The place of religion in social life has been both 
brought under control and made temporal in the context of centralized service provisions 
within the secular structure.27 In this way, ‘Diyanet is not an institution that shows how 
Kemalists are short of being secular. On the contrary, it is the institution of the way in which 
Kemalists become secular. It is the embodiment of authoritative secularism in Turkey.’28 By 
holding state security and integrity above democratic rights of inclusion, the Diyanet has 
become one of the crucial arms of the authoritarian Kemalist establishment.29
The restrictions imposed on the practice and promotion of other religious traditions in 
public services has produced constant tension between state-promoted Islam on the one 
hand, and other options such as Sufi orders, and especially the Alevi tradition, on the other. 
According to the Diyanet, these orders fragment national unity and solidarity. Therefore, 
the institution refuses to leave the interpretation of Alevism to Alevis or to accept the Alevi 
faith with its traditions and places of worship on an equal basis with Sunnism. In one of 
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the declarations on its website, the Diyanet sees Alevism as an umbrella name for religious 
groups such as the Bektaşiler, Erdebil Sufiyan Süreği Talibleri, Tahtacılar and Hubyarlılar, 
and acknowledges that it plays a valuable role in the social, cultural and historical formation 
of Turkish society.30 However, in the same declaration it denies the claim that it is a separate 
religion on the grounds that Alevism has fragmented formations within the nation-state 
and abroad, thus does not have a homogeneous structure and that anyway it accepts Islam 
as a religion, Muhammad as the last prophet and the Qur’an as the holy book. Furthermore, 
the Diyanet insists that Alevism is instead a rich and valuable ‘core of Islam’, which cannot 
be a distinct religion or different from the promoted Sunni version of Islam. The Diyanet 
thus recognizes the importance of the Alevis in Turkish history, yet sees them more as an 
ethnic group than a religious one, despite their own claims otherwise. The real issue here is 
not about how the Diyanet defines Alevism. The core of the problem is that the Diyanet, as 
a Sunni institution established within a secular state, claims to have the authority to define 
what Alevi faith is and should be. Through the Diyanet, the secular state positions itself as 
a theological authority, imposes orthodoxy over heterodoxy, and violates equal citizenship 
rights and freedom of religion in general.
National Education
The place of religion and religious instruction within the secular state has moved back and 
forth in the history of Turkey. While the national education system and the school curricu-
lum are controlled and planned by the Ministry of National Education, the military and the 
Diyanet have agreed that religious instruction must be part of national education. However, 
its content, the institutions involved in religious instruction and teaching conditions have 
always been the subject of debate. During different periods and based on the political climate 
at a particular time, religious instruction and training have been constantly reconfigured. 
Following its ideology of ‘ordering a disordered religious sphere’, the state made sure to 
provide an infrastructure for religious education that does not contradict secularism.31 
Accordingly, a series of laws formalized conditions for training prayer and preacher leaders, 
organizing Qur’an courses as well as teaching compulsory religious courses in primary and 
secondary education.
Under the Unification of Education Law in 1924, the state closed all religious schools 
and opened up imam-hatip schools to train religious officials who could serve in places of 
worship, and in line with the principles of nationalism, secularism and state-sanctioned 
Islam. Thus, it aimed to impose uniformity in religious practice and set standards of piety 
throughout the nation-state structure.32 Since their establishment, the destiny of these 
schools depended on the interests and policies of different governments. They were closed 
down in 1930 only to be reopened in 1948, when the state moved from a single-party democ-
racy to a multi-party democracy. After the 1971 military intervention, the first four years 
of schooling were abolished, allowing Imam hatibs to function only at the high school level 
and for three years. However, in 1980 the military promoted imam-hatips again in order to 
gain popular support and to spread a nationalized and homogenizing version of Islam as an 
antidote to leftist ideologies and booming claims of diverse ethno-religious communities. 
In addition to this, the rise of Islamic associations and orders, such as Naqshibandi and the 
Gulen movement, as well as the increased popularity of the Islamist political parties, such as 
the Welfare Party and its political idea of Muslim conservatism during the 1990s, raised the 
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demand for such schools, especially in urban areas. However, in 1997, as discussed above, 
by making the government comply with the measures of 28 February , the armed forces 
recommended that compulsory education change again from five to eight years. This led 
to the closure of the imam-hatip secondary schools.33 By then, secular groups began to see 
these schools as a potential threat to the secular foundation of the nation because of their 
raising radical religious groups that aimed to infiltrate the state by occupying high-rank 
cadres. As a result of the measures of 28 February, the military attempted to reinstate its 
control over religion, but only after observing that its previous efforts to use religion as a 
source of homogeneity in the 1980s went too far.
Besides compulsory education, university education has also been controlled by the 
state. The military regime of 1980 established the Higher Education Council (YOK), which 
is authorized to control the financial, administrative and ideological aspect of universities, 
giving way to its close supervision of academic freedom and autonomy. The YOK still 
maintains close control of academic life via mechanisms that range from the appointments 
and promotions of faculty members to checking on staff and student activities. Initially, 
most students and academics celebrated its formation and suggested policies, especially 
when YOK supported a ban on the headscarf in universities on the grounds that wearing 
such religious symbols was in conflict with the secular principles of the state. Considered 
a symbol of political Islam, women who wear the headscarf had to either drop out of uni-
versity or abandon this particular religious practice. Thus, YOK policies not only created 
problems of access to higher education for religious women but also affected the lifestyle 
of many women affected by such policies. This came with several social implications and 
problems related to women’s access to employment opportunities that require a university 
education, conflicts within families and public resentment towards government policies 
and groups that supported the ban.
Yet, this state-mandated mode of secularism meant neither neutrality nor enmity of the 
Kemalist state to religion. On the contrary, its positive biases towards the Sunni majority, 
as long as it remained under the strict control of the state, caused secularism to justify 
restrictions over democratic politics and liberal rights. In 2002, the AKP came up with a 
new political programme promising to reform this model of secularism along a democratic 
and liberal track while also furthering guarantees of religious freedom.
The AKP’s reshuffling of secularism: an alternative?
The AKP, emerging from a split in political Islam, came to power in 2002 after winning 34% 
of the votes and 363 of 550 seats in parliament. In the 2007 elections, the AKP increased 
its vote to 46%, in 2011 and 2015 to around 49%. This was a landslide victory in Turkish 
political history, especially for a party whose original members came mainly from the rounds 
of former Islamist movements. However, the AKP differed from its Islamist predecessors 
because it justified the aims of its political and social transformations with reference to 
democratic values, liberal principles and EU integration. Based on its programme, many 
scholars have defined the AKP as a centre-right party, Islamic liberal, conservative democrat, 
moderate Islam or passive secular.34 Accordingly, the party’s version of political Islam is 
compatible with liberal democracy and its programme should be viewed as a democratizing 
force in Turkey.
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Later in its tenure in government, the AKP presented its political programme as a struggle 
against military oversight and/or oppressive, elitist and exclusionary features of the secular 
model. By contrast, the party claimed to defend the neutrality of the state towards religion, 
and to contest the headscarf ban.
Over the course of its governance, the AKP has certainly challenged the Kemalist estab-
lishment and dismantled it as a state ideology. Especially after its first term in government, 
the AKP managed to limit the control of the military in civilian affairs. The e-declaration 
of 2007 was the final fight between the AKP majority and the military over the future of the 
secular system and what form it should take in public life. Additionally, the Constitutional 
Court also gradually lost its status as the guardian of Kemalist ideology, and all the remain-
ing institutions of the Kemalist ‘establishment’, such as the Higher Board of Education, the 
Diyanet, and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, came under the effective control of 
the AKP majority.35 There is no doubt that Turkey has undergone significant transformations 
under the AKP. However, what is contested is the direction of these changes in relation to 
the goals and structures of the founding Kemalist model. Those who consider the AKP to 
be a liberal or passive secular party make their arguments by showing how authoritarian 
the Kemalist model used to be, instead of checking how the AKP has transformed the insti-
tutions of the Kemalist state and its restrictive approach to plurality in society.36 A closer 
examination of the AKP’s transformation of the Kemalist model can inform us as to whether 
the AKP has institutionalized a more democratic and pluralist alternative, or it has merely 
appropriated the same repressive model to subject society to its own dictate of Islamization.
In its party programme, the AKP states that ‘it considers religion as one of the most 
important institutions of humanity and secularism as a prerequisite of democracy, and an 
assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience. It also rejects the interpretation and 
distortion of secularism as enmity against religion.’ In the programme, the AKP defines 
secularism as ‘a principle which allows people of all religion and beliefs to comfortably 
practice their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and live accord-
ingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to organise their lives along these lines. 
From this point of view, secularism is a principle of freedom and social peace.’37 Here, the 
AKP not only states its commitment to secularism defined along pluralistic lines, but also 
condemns discrimination based on religious beliefs. Specifically, the AKP ‘considers the 
attitudes and practices which disturb pious people, and which discriminate them due to 
their religious lives and preferences, as anti-democratic and in contradiction to human 
rights and freedoms’.38
Based on its programme, one can expect the AKP to reform the state in order to make 
it neutral towards any beliefs or non-beliefs, but also to institutionalize freedom of religion 
so that discriminatory practices favouring Sunni Islam would be abolished, thus moving 
the Kemalist secularism towards a more egalitarian and inclusive model. Yet, AKP-led 
reforms regarding the relations between state and religion show that the state architecture, 
which served to discriminate against religious groups and beliefs by favouring Sunni Islam, 
remained intact. In general, only Sunnis benefited from the AKP’s overhauling reforms; 
repressive practices and institutions that targeted others did not change much.
For one thing, the AKP failed to question and reform either the status of the Diyanet as 
a state institution or its Sunni character. To the extent that it mobilizes around one specific 
school of Islam, it is very difficult to reconcile the Diyanet with values of state neutrality 
and freedom of religion, which the AKP claims to defend. In fact, rather than dissolving 
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or downsizing the Diyanet, the AKP has substantially increased its share of the budget, its 
personnel and its influence. In 2015, the Diyanet’s budget amounted to 5.7 billion Turkish 
Lira, which is more than the sum of eight major ministries’ budget. The real inflation-ad-
justed increase in the Diyanet’s budget between 2002 and 2012 is around 176%.39 During the 
same period, the number Diyanet personnel has also increased from 74,000 to 141,000.40 
It is crucial to note that, despite its substantial enlargement, the Diyanet has not become 
more representative. That is to say, all the increased budget and personnel have been solely 
used in the service of the Sunni brand of Islam.
In the June 2015 elections, the AKP vehemently criticized proposals from the CHP 
(Republican People’s Party) for creating a more neutral and equidistant Diyanet. According 
to one of the founders of the AKP and current President, Erdogan: ‘The religion of this 
nation is clear… The members of other religious communities have their own institutions, 
and those are clear.’41 Erdogan’s statement shows that he views Sunni Islam as the religion 
of the nation, thus excluding both non-Muslims and other Muslims from his understand-
ing of the nation and the role of state institutions. When admitting that the Diyanet is an 
institution for Sunnis, he moreover fails to take into account that the huge budget comes 
from all Turkish taxpayers, irrespective of their religious affiliation. Erdogan was even more 
threatening to the HDP’s (Peoples’ Democratic Party) proposal to close down the Diyanet 
when he said, ‘to those who promise to abolish the Diyanet, it is clear what kind of a lesson 
our nation will teach them’.42
The Alevis’ objection to the role and structure of the Diyanet is crucial for understand-
ing the implications of the institution as well as the AKP’s efforts to use it in function of 
an ‘integrationist’ policy towards various religious groups. Alevis have demanded formal 
equal recognition of their religion through the granting of legal status as places of worship 
to cem houses (Alevi prayer places) and the abolition of compulsory religious education. 
In 2009, the AKP attempted to address some of the Alevi demands by organizing seven 
workshops. The Alevi opening, as presented by the ruling party, was supposed to change 
established state policies towards the Alevi population. On the contrary, the Alevi opening 
has shown that the AKP adopted the same strategy as the Kemalist state in its treatment of 
religious differences and identity claims. During the workshops the crucial disagreement 
between the AKP government and the Alevis concerned the nature of the Alevi issue. For 
the Alevis, their problems and concerns are political in nature and should be addressed 
as issues of freedom of religious worship and equality. However, the AKP insisted that it 
is necessary to clarify the relation between Alevism and Islam before responding to Alevi 
demands. The AKP’s main concern is to define the Alevi faith and to determine its main 
characteristics rather than to recognize the Alevi identity and their equal citizenship rights. 
Hence, the Alevi question, which is a political matter for the community concerned, is a 
theological question for the AKP.
The existence of a variety of interpretations of the Alevi faith among the community, and 
hence the lack of any single definition, is registered by the AKP as a problem and even one of 
the main sources of the issue. Instead of dealing with the political reasons for discrimination 
and exclusion of the Alevis, the AKP seems to accuse Alevis for their otherness. Whether 
such a single definition of the Alevi faith is reached by Alevis or made by the state is not 
the real issue. What is important is that such a definition excludes them from becoming 
part of a political debate. That the Alevis may or may not reach such a uniform definition 
of their faith, or celebrate the existence of a variety of interpretations as well as diversity 
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and plurality of practices as a constitutive part of the Alevi tradition, has no relevance to 
the Alevis’ demand for recognition and equality.
The Alevi opening shows that the AKP has no intention to approach the Alevi question 
as a demand for equality and recognition of their identity. The AKP’s concern is to deal 
with the Alevi question by defining the Alevi faith, its actors, rituals and spaces in order to 
make it acceptable for Sunni orthodoxy. To this end, the AKP aspires to organize the Alevi 
faith within the state by establishing educational institutions for Alevis, by appointing their 
leaders and regulating their sacred spaces.43 As Yalcinkaya and Ecevitoglu accurately explain, 
the AKP’s main aim is to reconstruct the Alevi tradition, similar to how the Kemalist state 
dealt with religion and plurality: organizing and regulating Sunni Islam within the state in 
order to enforce orthodoxy.44
As Borovali and Bayroz note, the Alevi issue represents two challenges for the unitary 
Turkish state.45 First, it raises the problem of recognizing ethnic and religious minority 
groups. For the Turkish state, any recognition and democratization in these matters could 
lead to the emergence of similar demands from other groups. This in return would lead 
to the second challenge of ‘weakening national unity and harmony’. As mentioned earlier, 
selecting and controlling an official religion for the society has been a central mechanism 
to construct the monolithic social structure the state aspires to. The equal recognition of 
Alevism and of cem houses as a place of worship would jeopardize the state’s monopoly. 
Constructing the recognition of Alevi as a security issue that threatens national unity is 
common to both Kemalist secularism and the AKP’s policies on religion.
The status of compulsory religious courses in public schools has been another source of 
conflict. Not only Alevis but also many other citizens who would prefer their children not 
to receive a religious education that is biased towards the Sunni interpretation of Islam are 
strongly opposed to these classes.46 Alevis took the issue to the European Court of Human 
Rights on two occasions. In both cases, the ECtHR ruled that compulsory religious classes 
in the Turkish education system violate certain basic human rights. In its recent decision 
on 16 September 2014, the Court called on Turkey to introduce ‘a system whereby pupils 
could be exempted from religion and ethics classes without their parents having to disclose 
their own religious or philosophical convictions’. Despite the objections of Alevis and the 
rulings of the ECtHR, however, the AKP insists on the necessity of compulsory religious 
education and its current content—teaching only the Sunni interpretation. The reason 
behind this insistence was clearly explained by Erdogan, who saw the compulsory religious 
courses as a policy in line with the ruling party’s aim to raise a pious generation.47 Without 
responding to Alevi objections and irrespective of the ECtHR’s decision, in 2012 the AKP 
introduced three optional religious courses on the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad’s life 
and the fundamentals of religion.
The aim of raising a pious generation has not been limited to compulsory religious 
courses. The AKP reformed the education system substantially for the same purpose. In 
2012, the ruling majority extended the eight-year compulsory education to 12 years with a 
new structure known as ‘4+4+4 Reform’ (Law no. 6287), with four-year phases of primary, 
secondary and high school. With the new system, the AKP reopened the imam-hatip’s 
secondary sections, enabling children to commence imam-hatip schooling at an earlier 
age. The new system also brought about a new placement procedure. As a result, ‘40,000 
students were automatically enrolled in imam-hatip schools against their will, including 
numerous Alevi and several Armenian students’.48 The AKP’s education system also changed 
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the regulations regarding Qur’an courses by lifting the age restriction, which used to be 12 
years old. In addition to supporting the role imam-hatip schools in the education system, 
the AKP substantially increased their number. Between 2010 and 2014, the number of 
imam-hatip schools increased by 73%.49 With these new arrangements, as Orhan Kemal 
Cengiz underlines, the AKP has transformed the imam-hatip schools ‘from a selective option 
to a central institution in the education system’ and is now able to effectively raise a pious 
generation from an early age.50
Conclusion 
The relationship between the state and religion established by the Republican regime has 
had discriminatory and repressive consequences for religious plurality in Turkey. Since the 
1990s, different groups including political Islam and the Alevi movements have increasingly 
challenged this relation as enabling discrimination and violation of equality.
In 2002, when the AKP came to power, it differentiated itself from the previous Islamic 
parties that propagated a radical agenda of political Islam. The party, moreover, promised 
to reform the established relation between state and religion towards a more liberal and plu-
ralist approach. In this article we have discussed the outcome and direction of the AKP-led 
transformation process with a special emphasis on secular arrangements to accommodate 
religious plurality.
We have argued that seeing the AKP as a liberal and pluralist alternative to Kemalist 
secularism, is, first of all, based on a misleading diagnosis of the Kemalist model. We cannot 
limit our understanding of the problems concerning religious freedom in Turkey, be it the 
headscarf issue or the Alevi question, by defining the Kemalist state in terms of privatization 
of religion or anti-religion. The Kemalist state, since its inception, adopted various policies 
in relation to religion, mostly depending on its perception of threat and enemy at a given 
time. On occasion, the state tried to restrict religion, seeing it as a threat, but at other times,it 
established educational institutions and increased the influence of religion in the society and 
used it as a source of empowerment, legitimacy and mobilization. The Kemalist state’s strat-
egy in approaching religion and religious plurality was to control religion by reconstructing 
orthodoxy through state institutions. Religious authorities within these institutions have 
claimed the monopoly in determining the true and correct interpretation of Islam, while 
the state established the necessary policies and mechanisms to make the Sunni version of 
Islam hegemonic in Turkish society.
If we are to document the authoritarian tendencies of Kemalist secularism in the way it 
reconstructs, regulates and disseminates a particular version of Islam as a building block 
in the formation of society and the individual, then, the AKP and its policies in relation to 
religion would mean a continuity of the same authoritarian practices and institutions. The 
functions of the Diyanet and compulsory religious education have been appropriated and 
used by the AKP, for the purpose of an even more conservative-Islamic political and social 
transformation. The AKP-led transformation, much like the old system, aims at eradicating 
plurality and creating a monolithic society through indoctrination, a strict state monopoly 
over religious matters, and discriminatory policies against alternative visions and beliefs. 
The litmus test for the AKP and its commitment to religious freedom should particularly 
take into account the Alevi question. The state’s attempt to reconstruct the Alevi faith 
demonstrates preservation of the repressive format of state–religion relations. Specifically, 
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the way the government handled the Alevi openings testified not to the AKP’s openness to 
dialogue and deliberation, but to its urge to suppress differences, especially when it comes 
to religious heterodoxy.
To understand the AKP and current conditions of religious plurality and freedom in 
Turkey, we have to approach the AKP and political Islam not as victims of Kemalist secu-
larism but as its benefactors. Ultimately, by looking at the Turkish experience of secularism, 
old and new, we can demonstrate that a democratic and pluralist arrangement that guar-
antees equality of all citizens is possible when the political actors give up the mechanism 
and benefits of a repressive state.
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